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NINETEEN YEARS AND COUNTING: RESOLVING THE
DEEP CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER WHETHER FAILURE TO
ATTACH A PROPERLY INCORPORATED
SUPPORTING DOCUMENT TO A SEARCH
WARRANT VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
WARRANT CLAUSE
M. Jackson Jones Esq., MS'
"This is an age in which one cannot find common sense
without a search warrant.
- George F. Will
I. INTRODUCTION
The plain text of the Fourth Amendment requires the search warrant
itself to particularly describe the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized. However, many federal courts have found the particu-
larity requirement could be satisfied by properly incorporating a support-
ing document into a search warrant.2 Nevertheless, these courts differ on
whether failure to attach a properly incorporated supporting document to
the search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment.
For instance, the federal Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia have held failure to attach the sup-
porting document to the search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment.'
In contrast, the federal Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Elev-
enth federal circuits, have held failure to attach the supporting document to
the search warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment.' This Article
will advocate adoption of the majority perspective by analyzing the history
1. M. Jackson Jones is an Assistant District Attorney for the Bristol County, Massachusetts
District Attorney's Office. He also teaches criminal law at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth.
I wish to thank my co-workers at the District Attorney's Office for their support: Kelly Costa-Edwards,
Derek Coyne, John Flor, Jennifer Gonzalez, and Carla Sauvignon. I am particularly indebted to my
grandmother, mother, Kenny Amoriggi, and Bristol County District Attorney C. Sam Sutter for their
insight, guidance, and support they each provided to me while writing this article.
2. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004).
3. Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. McGrew,
122 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1395 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 681 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1992); United States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72, 76 (8th Cir. 1990). These federal circuits follow the
majority perspective for search warrant incorporation.
4. Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 452
F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1351 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982). These federal circuits follow the minority per-
spective for search warrant incorporation.
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of the Fourth Amendment, caselaw from the majority and minority per-
spectives, and the public policies underlying the Fourth Amendment.
Part I will provide a brief history of the Fourth Amendment and Part
II will examine the constitutional requirements for a valid search warrant.
Part III will discuss the deep federal circuit split surrounding this issue.
In addition, this section will also analyze several opinions from both the
majority and minority perspectives.
Part IV will analyze the United States Supreme Court's ("Supreme
Court") decision in United States v. Groh ("Groh"). This is the Supreme
Court's most recent decision addressing search warrant incorporation.
Part V will discuss the public policies underlying the Fourth Amend-
ment and Part VI will address whether the United States v. Leon ("Leon")
exception to the exclusionary rule applies to four different scenarios in-
volving a search warrant and its supporting document.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The history underlying the Fourth Amendment is unique because it
has foundations in both colonial America and England.' The following
sub-sections will provide an in-depth discussion of the Fourth Amendment
by examining some of the historical events and cases that impacted the
adoption and modern interpretation of it.
A. Historical Developments Prior to Adoption of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment is the foundation of all searches and seizures
conducted by government officials. Prior to enacting this amendment, the
government had unfettered power to search and seize any person, place, or
thing.' There was no mechanism to protect citizens from government in-
trusion into their private homes. In effect, "[o]nce in a house, in other
words, everything was fair game. And law enforcement officials could de-
cide whether to arrest suspects without any oversight."" The Fourth
Amendment, which was adopted by Congress in 1789 and became a part of
the Bill of Rights in 1791, ended this type of intrusive government
behavior.
Two separate clauses are contained within the actual text of the Fourth
Amendment. The first clause prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The second clause, known as the Warrant Clause, mandates
probable cause support every search warrant issued by the government.9
5. See Gov't Printing Office, Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure 1199 (2002), http://origin.
www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf/con015.pdf.
6. See Harold J. Krent, The Continuity Principle, Administrative Constraint, and the Fourth
Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 53, 57 (2005).
7. Id.
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The Warrant Clause, which states: "no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," governs
how the federal government issues search warrants.'
"Interpreted literally, the Amendment requires neither a warrant for
each search or seizure, nor probable cause to support a search or seizure.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court imposes a presumptive warrant require-
ment for searches and seizures and generally requires probable cause for a
warrantless search or seizure to be 'reasonable.'""
Our Founding Fathers developed the Fourth Amendment's Warrant
Clause, because they wanted to end the use of general warrants.12 General
warrants, which were search warrants lacking an oath or probable cause,
provided government officials with the ability to conduct a blanket search
of a home." In addition, any evidence discovered during the search could
be used against the citizen.
1. Semayne's Case (1603)
Although Semayne's Case'4 was a civil case, it had a significant impact
on the development of the Fourth Amendment. In Semayne's Case, Rich-
ard Gersham ("Gersham") and George Berisford ("Berisford") owned a
home in London, England.'" Berisford died and left some items to Peter
Semayne ("Semayne").16 Semayne did not receive these items and sued to
gain possession of them." These items were eventually recovered by a
sheriff.'" The sheriff, acting under the powers of a government issued writ,
broke doors and entered Berisford and Gersham's home.19
The court held, "the sheriff may break the party's house, either to ar-
rest him, or to do other execution of the K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he
cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his
coming, and to make request to open doors . . . ."20 In addition, the court
also noted, "the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as
well for his defense against injury and violence as for his repose."" Hence,
the ruling of Semayne's Case recognized the right of a homeowner to pro-
tect his home from unlawful entry by government agents. 2 2 However, the
court also recognized that a government agent could break and enter a
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Keith Shotzberger, Twenty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: I. Investigation and
Police Practices, 85 GEO. L.J. 821, 821 (1997).
12. See Davies, supra note 8, at 555.
13. Id.





19. Id. at 195.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Gov't Printing Office, supra note 5, at 1199.
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person's home if the agent provided notice and had a court order to arrest
or execute a governmental process.23
The years following Semayne's Case consisted of more legal attacks
against government execution of general warrants. The most notable of
these attacks were the Writs of Assistance Case, Wilkes v. Woods
("Wilkes"), and Entick v. Carrington ("Entick").
2. The Writs of Assistance Case (1761)
American colonists were consistently subjected to the horrible effects
of general warrants and writs of assistance ("writs"). 24 King George II is-
sued writs that allowed British officials to search for imported goods that
had not been taxed. 25 The writs issued by King George II were extremely
broad and general. For instance, these writs allowed state officials to
''enter any house or other place to search for and seize 'prohibited and
uncustomed' goods. . . ."26 Some of King George's writs even forced colo-
nists to aid state officials in the execution of their searches.27
The writs were effective for only six months after the death of the
sovereign.2 8 Thus, when King George died in 1760, British officials had to
obtain new writs.29 However, colonists challenged the issuance of new
writs, because they were upset with the government's use of them.3 0
In particular, James Otis, an American colonist, argued that the writs
were unlawful." He believed "[the writs] granted 'a power that places the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.' "32 Otis also noted
that the writs allowed government officials to "enter our houses when they
please . . . break locks, bars and everything in their way."3 3 He recognized
that, "no man, no court can inquire - bare suspicion without oath is suffi-
cient [to issue a writ]."3 4 Otis lost his case, but his arguments did not go
unnoticed. In response to Otis's arguments, the Massachusetts General
Assembly enacted stricter requirements for obtaining writs. 5 For example,
one new requirement shortened the duration of writs.36
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1200. "[W]rits of assistance ... were general warrants authorizing the bearer to
enter any house or other place to search for and seize 'prohibited and uncustomed' goods, and com-
manding all subjects to assist in these endeavors." Id.
25. See Krent, supra note 6, at 57.





31. Krent, supra note 6, at 58.
32. Id. (quoting M. H. Smith, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 342 (1978)).
33. Id. (quoting M. H. Smith, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 342 (1978)).
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3. Wilkes v. Wood (1763)
Shortly after the Writs of Assistance Case, the English courts were
faced with the case of Wilkes v. Wood, a civil case for damages. 7 In Wilkes,
John Wilkes ("Wilkes") published pamphlets that attacked the King and
British government.38  Government officials were provided with an ex-
tremely broad general warrant that allowed them "to make strict and dili-
gent search for the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious and
treasonable paper, intitled [sic], the North Briton, No. 45 . . . and them, or
any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize, together with their pa-
pers."3  This warrant was used to not only arrest Wilkes, but also seize his
books and papers.40
Wilkes successfully sued the government official responsible for the
search and received a judgment of one thousand pounds.4 1 The court sided
with Wilkes for several reasons. It recognized this warrant lacked probable
clause, because it was "based on information 'which had not the least
shadow of probability in it."' 4 2 Additionally, this same general warrant
was used for later searches.43 In fact, this one general warrant had been
used to search at least five private residences and arrest over forty British
subjects.4 4 During the execution of this general warrant, government offi-
cials even forced one person out of bed in the middle of the night.45
Two years after Wilkes, the British courts addressed the use of another
general warrant in Entick v. Carrington.46
4. Entick v. Carrington (1765)
In Entick, the British government used a general warrant to search the
home of John Entick, an associate of John Wilkes.4 7 Government officials
broke into locked desks and seized printed charts, pamphlets, and other
materials that belonged to Entick.4 8 Entick filed suit against the state for
trespass.49 The court held, "the warrant and the behavior it authorized
37. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K. B.). Wood was the King's Messenger that led the execution of
the general warrant.
38. Id.
39. Krent, supra note 6, at 58. (quoting R. v. Wilkes, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 737, [737).
40. Michael Longyear, Note, To Attach or Not to Attach: The Continued Confusion Regarding
Search Warrants and the Incorporation of Supporting Documents, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 387, 391 (2007).
41. 98 Eng. Rep. at 499; but see Longyear supra note 40, at 391-92 (noting damages recovered
was five thousand pounds).
42. Jon Eldredge, National Perspective, Detainment of United States Citizens as Enemy Combat-
ants Under a Fourth Amendment Historical Analysis, 6 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 19, 25 (2004) (quoting
William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 757, 888 (1990) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Krent, supra note 6, at 58.
46. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
47. Gov't Printing Office, supra note 5, at 1200. Nathan Carrington was the King's messenger
that led the group of officials that entered Entick's home.
48. Id.
49. Thomas K. Clancy, What is a "Search" within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70
ALB. L. REv. 1, 5 (2006).
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[was] subversive 'of all the comforts of society."'o It also noted, "the issu-
ance of a warrant for the seizure of all of a person's papers rather than only
those alleged to be criminal in nature [was] 'contrary to the genius of the
law of England."'
Entick has been praised as a "great judgment," "one of the landmarks
of English liberty," "one of the permanent monuments of the British Con-
stitution," and "a guide to an understanding the Framers [intent] in writing
the Fourth Amendment." 52
5. The Townshend Act (1767)
The debates over writs and general warrants did not cease with Entick.
In 1767, the English government passed the Townshend Act. The Act was
passed to "eliminate lingering questions over the legality of writs of assis-
tance."5 3 In fact, the Attorney General of England, William de Grey,
stated the Act "does nothing more than facilitate the execution of the [cus-
tom's official's] power by making the disobedience of the writ a contempt
of court."54
After the British government passed this Act, American colonists ex-
pressed more dismay with the government's use of writs and general war-
rants. One citizen said, "our houses and even our bed chambers are
exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, rav-
aged and plundered by wretches .".. .5 Another citizen stated, "a petty
officer has power to cause the doors and locks of any man to be broke
open, to enter his most private cabinet, and thence to take and carry away,
whatever he shall in his pleasure deem uncustomed goods."" These con-
cerns resonated with colonial judges, because they refused to grant re-
quests for general warrants." Judges refused to grant requests even
though the Townshend Act authorized the use of general warrants.
The nexus between the Townshend Act and the Fourth
Amendment is easy to discern. As Professor Davies notes:
The memory of Parliament's 1767 reauthorization of gen-
eral warrants for customs searches of houses was the princi-
pal stimulus for the adoption of bans against general
50. Gov't Printing Office, supra note 5, at 1200 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng.
Rep. 807, 818 (K.B.)).
51. Id. (quoting Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (K.B.)).
52. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886)).
53. Eldredge, supra note 42, at 26 (quoting Tracy Maclin, Let Sleepoing Dogs Lie: Why the Su-
preme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REv. 895, 961 (2002)).
54. Id. at 26-27.
55. See id. at 26 (quoting NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY & DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 71 (1937).
56. Krent, supra note 6, at 59 (quoting Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MicH. L. REv. 547, 602 n.139 (1999)).
57. Id. (quoting Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 547, 582 n.83 (1999)).
58. See id.
[VOL. 29:4954
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warrants in the state declarations of rights adopted between
1776 and 1784, and for the anti-Federalist calls for a federal
ban against general warrants during the constitutional ratifi-
cation debates of 1787-88. Indeed, the actions of colonial
judges in the Townshend controversy signified the begin-
nings of a dialogue on the writs and of a consensus against
general warrants by the American judiciary. Resistance to
the Townshend writs was something more than a local ques-
tion and with such a widespread legal discussion it is hardly
to be wondered if a fourth amendment was proposed for the
American Constitution.59
When drafting the Constitution our Founding Fathers considered the
aforementioned abuses associated with writs and general warrants.6 0 James
Madison believed "the great mass of the people who opposed [the pro-
posed Constitution] disliked it because it did not contain effectual provi-
sions against the encroachment on particular rights and those safeguards
which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them
and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign power." 6'
B. The Fourth Amendment is Born (1791)
On December 15, 1791, following much debate and drafting, the
Fourth Amendment came into effect. The text of the amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.62
The Fourth Amendment resolved many of the concerns associated
with writs and general warrants, because it contained provisions that con-
trolled the federal government's use of search warrants.
C. The Fourth Amendment Applied to the States:
Wolf v. Colorado (1949)
Prior to 1949, the Fourth Amendment was only applicable to the fed-
eral government. Hence, state governments were not required to follow
the Fourth Amendment's constitutional requirements for search warrants.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Wolf v. California ("Wolf")
59. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amend-
ment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 961 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
60. See id.
61. Eldredge, supra note 42, at 27 (quoting NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY & DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUION 87 (1937)).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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made the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states through its incorpo-
ration into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.63
Wolf was a doctor whose practice primarily focused on "the treatment
of diseases of women, obstetrics, and pelvic and abdominal surgery."'
Montgomery was a licensed chiropractor. 65 Believing Wolf and Montgom-
ery were illegally performing abortions, "[r]epresentatives of the district
attorney's office . . . went to the office of Wolf without a warrant and took
him into custody . .. [the representatives also] took possession [of incrimi-
nating evidence used to prosecute Wolf and Montgomery]."6 6
Wolf's case reached the Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter, author of
the Court's majority opinion, wrote, "[t]he security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment - is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the con-
cept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause."6 7
III. SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
The Fourth Amendment establishes the requirements for issuing a
search warrant. First, it must be supported by an oath or affirmation.
Second, the search warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached mag-
istrate.69 Third, it must be based on probable cause.70 Last, the search
warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The following sub-sections will examine
these four constitutional requirements.
A. "No Warrants shall issue .. . [unless] supported
by Oath or affirmation"
The purpose of the oath or affirmation requirement is to ensure that
someone is held accountable for the information contained in the search
warrant. The history of this requirement, like the history of the Fourth
Amendment, has roots in both England and the colonial United States.
"In 1662, Parliament authorized the issuance of general warrants . . . for
63. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Wolf was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); however, the Mapp Court still recognized the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the
states. Id. at 654. The Mapp Court noted, "[s]ince the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforce-
able against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government." Id.
64. Wolf v. State, 187 P.2d 926, 927 (Colo. 1947).
65. Id.
66. Id. Both Wolf and Montgomery were convicted of conspiracy to commit abortion and sen-
tenced to the state penitentiary for twelve to eighteen months. Id. at 926.
67. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69. See id.; Whiteley v Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
70. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
71. Id.
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collecting taxes and enforcing custom laws." 72 In addition, this law re-
quired anyone seeking a general warrant to sign an oath. Merely two
years later, Parliament deleted the oath requirement.74
The writs, which were provided to government officials after 1664,
were used to search the homes of American colonists. Moreover, these
post-oath writs were used to "search wherever government officials chose
with merely absolute and unlimited discretion." 7 6 The states recognized
the importance of having an oath or affirmation. For instance, in 1776, the
Pennsylvania Constitution had a provision requiring any warrant to issue
upon an oath or affirmation. Interestingly, "[t]he Pennsylvania provision
was the basis for the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which include[s] the oath or affirmation language."7
B. Warrants Must be Signed by a Neutral and Detached Magistrate
The requirement that a warrant be issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate is not found in the Fourth Amendment.7 9 Instead, the Supreme
Court developed this requirement.so The Court believed that in order to
preserve the integrity of both the government and the Fourth Amendment,
a search warrant must be issued by a neutral magistrate that was not in-
volved with the underlying case."
The purpose of this requirement is to let a neutral and detached magis-
trate determine when a search warrant is appropriate. In Johnson v. United
States, the Supreme Court wrote:
[T]he point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it de-
nies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. [It requires]
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magis-
trate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in ...
ferreting out crime.82
In effect, the neutral and detached magistrate serves as a protector of
the people, whose main job is to limit the police's discretion and abuse of
power during the execution of a search warrant.
72. State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Wis. 2001).






79. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
80. See generally Whiteley v Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
81. Id. at 564. ("judicial officer" must issue warrant for either an arrest or a search); Jones v
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960) ("independent judicial officer" necessary for issuance of
warrant).
82. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 464 (1932)).
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The Supreme Court established two tests for determining whether a
party has the authority to issue a search warrant. Under the first test, the
issuing party must be neutral and detached.8 3 The second test requires the
issuing party be capable of deciding whether or not probable cause exists
for an arrest or search.8 4 "The first test cannot be met when the issuing
party is himself [or herself] engaged in law enforcement activities .. . [aind
in passing the second test, the court has been essentially pragmatic in as-
sessing whether the issuing party possesses the capacity to determine prob-
able cause."85
C. "No Warrants Shall Issue, but Upon Probable Cause"
The probable cause requirement also has roots in England. General
warrants were issued without a determination of probable cause. This
made the issuance of these warrants very simple.
The states wanted to end this practice. Virginia was one of the first
states that required probable cause be found before a search warrant is-
sued. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was adopted in 1776,
stated, "'general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be com-
manded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed,
or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not partic-
ularly described and supported by evidence .. . ought not to be granted.'" 8 6
This sentiment was also reflected in the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, which stated "[a]ll warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and op-
pressive; and all general warrants . . . are illegal, and ought not to be
granted.'" 8 7 Even the North Carolina Declaration of Rights declared,
"[g]eneral warrants, whereby any officer or other person may be com-
manded to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed,
or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particu-
larly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and
shall not be granted."" In addition, the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
Constitutions have provisions mandating all warrants be based upon a find-
ing of probable cause.89
Probable cause is not defined in the Fourth Amendment.9 0 Instead, its
definition derived from court interpretation of the amendment. The Su-
preme Court describes probable cause as "'[t]he facts and circumstances
83. Gov't. Printing Office, supra note 5, at 1216-17.
84. Id. at 1217.
85. Id. at 1216-17.
86. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights
(1776), art. X).
87. Id. at 101 (quoting Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776), art. XXIII).
88. N.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 20.
89. Henry, 361 U.S. at 101.
90. Gov't. Printing Office, supra note 5.
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before [an] officer [that would] warrant a man of prudence and caution in
believing that the offense has been committed."'91
In deciding whether probable cause exits, courts can use one of two
tests: the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test or the "totality of the circum-
stances" test. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the court determines
whether a warrant is valid by examining (1) the basis of the informant's
knowledge and (2) the veracity of the informant.92
In 1983, the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and
adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test.9 3 Under this test, the ve-
racity and basis of knowledge prongs are not independent. "Instead, they
are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determi-
nations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some
other indicia of reliability."9 '
D. "No Warrants Shall Issue ... [unless] Particularly Describing the
Place to be Searched, and the Persons or Things to be Seized"
The particularity provision of the Fourth Amendment requires any
search warrant to "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." 95 This provision was enacted to curtail the
blanket searches conducted under general warrants. As one Supreme
Court Justice noted, "[v]ivid in the memory of the newly independent
Americans were those general warrants known as 'writs of assistance' . . .
[that] had given custom officials blanket authority to search where they
pleased . . . ."96 The particularity requirement ensures government
searches will not develop into the general searches our Founding Fathers
despised.
The particularity requirement can be satisfied by cross-referencing or
incorporating another document. However, the cross-referencing or in-
corporation is constitutional only if the warrant itself contains the appro-
priate words of incorporation.
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT
The federal courts of appeals are split on whether failure to attach a
properly incorporated supporting document to a search warrant violates
the Fourth Amendment. This part of the Article will discuss this split by
91. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 267 U.S. 642, 645
(1878)); see also Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925) (describing probable cause as "such
that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the
offense charged.").
92. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969).
93. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
94. Id. at 233.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965).
97. Groh, 540 U.S. at 557.
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analyzing several decisions addressing this issue. The first portion of this
session will discuss three opinions following the majority perspective. The
second portion will discuss two decisions adopting the minority
perspective.
A. Majority Perspective: The United States Courts of Appeals for the
First, Third, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia
Federal Circuits
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
District of Columbia have concluded that a search warrant's supporting
document could satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement
if the supporting document accompanied the warrant, and the warrant used
suitable words of reference which incorporated the supporting document."
The following sub-sections will examine relevant caselaw from three of
these six federal courts of appeals.
1. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: United States
v. Curry (1990)
a. The Factual Background
On October 6, 1988, police executed a search warrant for Tanell
Curry's ("Curry") residence. 99 The purpose of this warrant was to obtain
evidence from some robberies that had been committed.100 During the ex-
ecution of this search warrant, police discovered illegal narcotics and drug
paraphernalia.101 After observing the illegal narcotics and drug parapher-
nalia, police obtained another search warrant.102 The second search war-
rant led to the discovery of other incriminating items, which included two
firearms and over 500 grams of cocaine.103
b. The Procedural History
Curry sought to suppress the evidence obtained from execution of
both search warrants, as well as a Franks Hearing.104 The magistrate for
the United States District of Minnesota recommended Curry's request for
a motion to suppress be denied.' The magistrate also denied Curry's mo-
tion for a Franks hearing.' 0 6 The district court judge also denied both of
98. Bartholomew, 221 F.3d at 428-29 (emphasis added); McGrew, 122 F.3d at 849-50 Dahlman,
13 F.3d at 1395; Dale, 991 F.2d at 846-47; Morris, 977 F.2d at 681 n.3; Curry, 911 F.2d at 77.





104. Id. In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that, "[wihere the defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment [to the United States
Constitution] requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request." 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
105. Curry, 911 F.2d at 74.
106. Id.
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Curry's requests.10 7 After the district court judge's ruling, the case was
tried and Curry was convicted.108
c. A Summation of the Pertinent Portions of the Majority Opinion
First, the court of appeals noted that the Fourth Amendment requires
a search warrant to be particular - i.e. describe the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.' 0 9 It then noted the first search
warrant did not particularly describe the places to be searched and items to
be seized.110 Instead, "the space for filling in that information was left
blank.""' The government conceded the space was blank; however, it ar-
gued the particularity requirement was fulfilled by the supporting affidavit,
which provided the address of the residence being searched.1' 2
The court recognized that under the traditional rule, a search warrant
that lacked particularity could not be cured by a supporting affidavit, be-
cause a supporting affidavit was not a part of the warrant itself.1 ' How-
ever, it did note an exception to the traditional rule. The court wrote that
the supporting affidavit could satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement if "a) the affidavit accompanies the warrant, and b) the war-
rant uses suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit
therein."114 The court then applied this two-part test to the first search
warrant.
The court held the government's first warrant failed this test, because
it did not contain suitable words of reference that incorporated the sup-
porting affidavit into the warrant itself."' It noted that such suitable words
of reference included "see attached affidavit" or "as described in the affi-
davit."" 6 Instead of using any of the aforementioned words of reference,
this warrant stated, "[w]hereas, the application and supporting affidavit of
[Detective] Ross Swanson (was) (were) duly presented and read by the
Court, and being fully advised in the premises. ... ".
These words were not suitable words of reference. Thus, the court
held the first search warrant was invalid."18 Because the first warrant was
invalid, the court held the second warrant "was also invalid because proba-
ble cause from it was based upon information obtained during execution of
the first search warrant."11 9
107. Id.
108. Id.




113. Id. at 76-77.
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After finding both search warrants were invalid, the court then dis-
cussed whether or not the evidence obtained from the warrants were ad-
missible under the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule. In Leon, the
Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence ob-
tained by an officer that acted "in objectively reasonable reliance on a sub-
sequently invalidated search warrant."120
As for the first search warrant, the application for the warrant and the
supporting affidavit, which were attached the warrant itself, stated the
place to be searched was 1209 Devonshire Curve.12 1 The warrant itself
never contained this information. 122 The magistrate signed the warrant and
the supporting affidavit and gave it back to the detective.12 3 The magis-
trate recognized the warrant did not have the place to be searched; how-
ever, he thought this was a clerical error on the part of the detective.124
The court believed the magistrate should have corrected the address
omission, because the magistrate is the final reviewing authority of the war-
rant.125 Since "the exclusionary rule [did] not serve to deter the errors of
judges, but rather the errors of police officers," the court ruled suppression
of evidence derived from the first warrant would not be appropriate. 2 6 As
for the second warrant, the court wrote, "an objectively reasonable officer
could have believed the information contained in the affidavit supporting
the second search warrant had been lawfully obtained." 127 Thus, evidence
obtained from the second search warrant was also admissible under the
Leon exception.128
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: United States
v. McGrew (1997)
a. The Factual Background
In McGrew, a magistrate issued a search warrant for the home of
Chong Hyon McGrew ("McGrew").1 29 The search warrant was based on
Drug Enforcement Agent ("DEA") Jonathan Andersen's ("Andersen")
belief McGrew was involved in drug trafficking.'30 The warrant itself failed
to identify any evidence of criminal activity. 131 However, "[in the space
provided for that information, the warrant referred the reader to the 'at-
tached affidavit which is incorporated herein.'"132
120. Id. (discussing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)). The Leon exception to the
exclusionary rule is further discussed in Section VII of this Article.
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After receiving the search warrant, Andersen and other DEA agents
executed it and recovered numerous items from McGrew's home. The
items recovered included a glass tube with drug residue, cash, notepads,
and plastic bags.13 4 McGrew was present when the search warrant was exe-
cuted by Andersen and the DEA agents. 3 5 However, Andersen did not
have the supporting affidavit."3 Thus, McGrew never saw a copy of the
affidavit supporting the search warrant.1 37
b. The Procedural History
McGrew filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during execu-
tion of the search warrant.13 8 McGrew argued the search warrant lacked
particularity, because the supporting affidavit was not attached to the war-
rant itself.139 The district court denied the motion for two reasons.140 First,
it found the supporting affidavit satisfied the Fourth Amendment's particu-
larity requirement.' 4 ' Second, the court reasoned there was no prior prece-
dent requiring officers to attach a supporting affidavit to a search
warrant.142
c. A Summation of the Pertinent Portions of the Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's rul-
ing.14 It noted the lower court's ruling, "contradicts a long line of this
circuit's clearly established Fourth Amendment precedent."'"
The court of appeals began its analysis by discussing some of the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. 45 It recog-
nized the particularity requirement protects citizens from being subjected
to general searches.' 46 After discussing this policy, the court examined the
warrant used to search McGrew's home.14 7 It noted the warrant itself did
not satisfy the particularity requirement, because it did not describe the
items to be seized or the crime being investigated. 48 Instead, "[t]he war-
rant only referred to an 'attached affidavit which is incorporated
herein."' 149 The court expressed concern with the government's failure to
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 849.
136. See id. at 848-49.






143. Id. at 850.
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show if the supporting affidavit was even attached to the search warrant.15 0
Additionally, the court was concerned with the government's inability to
prove if the warrant and supporting affidavit were present during the
search.151
The court acknowledged a "search warrant may be construed with ref-
erence to the affidavit for purposes of satisfying the particularity require-
ment if (1) the affidavit accompanies the warrant, and (2) the warrant uses
suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit therein."15 2 Ac-
cording to the court, this two-part test served two very important pur-
poses.15 3 First, attaching the supporting document to the search warrant
limits the executing officer's discretion.154 Second, attaching the support-
ing document to the search warrant ensures the person being searched has
notice of what items can be seized. 5 5
In the court's opinion, the second goal was not met because McGrew
never saw a copy of the supporting affidavit.156 Moreover, the court wrote
the first goal was probably unsatisfied because the supporting document
never accompanied the search warrant. 5 1
The court also rejected the government's argument that it could refuse
to produce a supporting document in order to protect confidential informa-
tion or witnesses.158 The court stated, the government must particularly list
the items to be seized in the warrant itself, if it chose to keep an affidavit or
supporting document under seal.159 The court further wrote, "[iut is the
government's duty to serve the search warrant on the suspect, and the war-
rant must contain, either on its face or by attachment, a sufficiently particu-
lar description of what is to be seized." 6 0
The court also found the Leon exception did not apply to this search
warrant.161 It ruled there could not be an objective reasonable basis for
believing that the warrant was valid, because the supporting affidavit was
not attached to the warrant itself.'6 2 Thus, "[i]f the 'incorporated' affidavit
[did] not accompany the warrant, agents [could not] claim good faith reli-
ance on the affidavit's contents."163
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis added).










163. Id. The McGrew court also noted "the good faith exception is not available because (1) the
requirement of attaching affidavits to general warrants has been the clear law of this circuit for over a
decade, foreclosing any 'reasonable belief' to the contrary; and (2) no matter how aware the officers are
of the limits of their search, the person being searched (the second aim of the rule) is still completely
unaided when agents fail to produce a document explaining the parameters of the search." Id. at 850
n.5.
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3. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: Bartholomew
v. Pennsylvania (2000)
a. The Factual Background
In 1994, the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General received in-
formation that Gene and Robin Bartholomew ("Bartholomews") were par-
ticipating in criminal acts." In 1995, an agent of the Pennsylvania
Attorney General's office applied for warrants to search two properties
owned by the Bartholomews.' 65 When he applied for the search warrants
the agent provided the judge with two exhibits.1 6 6
The first exhibit ("Exhibit A") contained a list of items the agent ex-
pected to seize during execution of the search warrants.16' The second ex-
hibit ("Exhibit B") consisted of a forty-nine page affidavit describing the
agent's probable cause for believing the Bartholomews were engaged in
criminal acts.' 68 The judge issued the search warrants. 169 In addition, the
judge also placed Exhibit A and Exhibit B under seal.'7 0
The search warrants were executed on September 11, 1995.' "The
Bartholomews were given an inventory of the items seized but were not
given Exhibit A, the list of items to be seized."17 2 Exhibit A and Exhibit B
were unsealed subsequent to the search of the Bartholomew's property.173
b. The Procedural History
In November 1995, the Bartholomews sought the return of their prop-
erty. 1 7 4  The judge ruled the search warrants used to take the
Bartholomews' property were invalid.7 He held the warrants "were un-
lawful because they neither named nor described with particularity the
property to be seized and the list of items to be seized was sealed." 176
Nearly two years later, the Bartholomews filed a complaint against
one of the agents who executed the search warrants. 77 They alleged "that
probable cause did not exist and that because the affidavit and the list of
164. Bartholomew, 221 F.3d at 426.
165. Id. The Bartholomews owned two separate properties, both of which were searched. They
owned a retail and music store called "Toones," as well as a home. Id.
166. Id. at 426-27.






173. Id. Exhibit A was unsealed one week after the searches and Exhibit B was unsealed four
months after the searches. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. No criminal charges were filed against the couple. Id.
177. Id.
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items to be seized were sealed, the warrants deprived [them] of their right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. "178
The district court granted the agent's motion for summary judgment
for all of his claims except one. 1 7 9 It found the agent acted against a
"clearly established constitutional right" when he executed a search war-
rant that did not describe with particularity the items to be seized.18 0 The
agent appealed the district court's ruling.' 8'
c. A Summation of the Pertinent Portions of the Majority Opinion
The court of appeals analysis began with a reference to the actual text
of the Fourth Amendment.182 The court noted that the Fourth Amend-
ment "protects 'the right of people to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures.'"" The court then noted the warrant itself must
"particularly describe[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."" The warrant must be particular, because - as the court
recognized - particularity stops police from conducting general and discre-
tionary searches.' 5
In the Third Circuit, "when a warrant is accompanied by an affidavit
that is incorporated by reference, the affidavit may be used in construing
the scope of the warrant." 86 The court stated the purpose of this rule is to
limit the executing agent's discretion during the search.' In addition, the
court also recognized another purpose of the rule is to provide the target of
the search with notice of the items being seized.18 8
In this case, the search warrant properly incorporated Exhibit A - the
list of items to be seized. 189 However, the court stated the supporting doc-
ument was not attached to the warrant, but placed under seal.190 In reiter-
ating rationales of the McGrew court, the court informed the government
that, "'[i]f [it] wishes to keep an affidavit under seal . . . it must list the
items it seeks with particularity in the warrant itself.'"191 It further stated
the government had an obligation to provide the suspect with a copy of the
search warrant that particularly describes, "on its face or by attachment,"
what items are to be seized.' 92





182. Id. at 428.
183. Id. (quoting Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1997)).
184. Id. (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.).
185. Id.
186. Id.




191. Id. (quoting United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1997) (alteration to the
original in the quoted text).
192. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court also disagreed with the district court's decision that the
agent violated a "clearly established constitutional right."193 It recognized
that the courts and federal Constitution clearly established that a warrant
must be particular; however, the courts nor the Constitution have clearly
established "whether . .. one has a constitutional right to be free from a
search pursuant to a warrant based upon a sealed list of items to be
seized."' 94
d. Minority Perspective: The United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Federal Circuits
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh federal circuits have concluded that a
search warrant's supporting document could satisfy the Fourth Amend-
ment's particularity requirement by either referencing the supporting docu-
ment or having the supporting document attached to the warrant itself.195
The following sub-sections will examine relevant caselaw from two of these
federal circuits.
4. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: United States v.
Baranski (2006)
a. The Factual Background
Keith Baranski ("Baranski") was a licensed firearms dealer.'96 He im-
ported firearms from Europe and stored them in a warehouse.19 7 These
firearms were stored in a warehouse because federal law mandated Baran-
ski possess the firearms until they were sold to law enforcement
departments. 198
However, instead of selling the firearms to law enforcement depart-
ments, Baranski sold them illegally.199 Michael Johnson ("Johnson"), an
agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") discov-
ered Baranski's illegal activity. 20 Thus, on April 10, 2001, Johnson applied
for a search warrant for the Pars warehouse, the place Baranski kept the
firearms.20'
While applying for the search warrant, Baranski prepared an affidavit
providing probable cause for the search, as well as identifying the place to
be searched and the items to be seized.202 The warrant itself did not partic-
ularly describe the items to be seized or place to be searched.203 Instead,
193. Id. at 429.
194. Id.
195. See Baranski, 452 F.3d at 440 (emphasis added); Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 471; Wuagneux, 683
F.2d at 1351 n.6.
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the warrant stated "See Attached Affidavit," which was a reference to
Johnson's prepared supporting affidavit.20 4 A magistrate granted John-
son's search warrant request.205 In addition, the magistrate sealed the sup-
porting affidavit to protect the BATF's confidential informants.2 0 6
Johnson executed the search warrant on April 11, 2001.207 The attor-
ney for Pars, Saeid Shafizadeh ("Shafizadeh"), was present at the ware-
house during the warrant's execution.208  BATF agents provided
Shafizadeh with a copy of the search warrant, but not the supporting affida-
vit.2 0 9 The agents told Shafizadeh the supporting affidavit was placed
under seal.210
BATF agents commenced a search of the warehouse. 2 11 As a result of
the search, the agents uncovered 372 machine guns and twelve crates of
firearm accessories.2 12 They left a copy of the search warrant and inven-
tory of seized firearms with Shafizadeh.2 1 3
b. The Procedural History
On July 5, 2001, both Baranski and Pars filed a Bivens money-damages
action against the BATF agents.2 1 4 They claimed the agents violated their
Fourth Amendment rights.2 15 In addition, Baranski and Pars sought to un-
seal the supporting affidavit.2 16 On March 22, 2002, the district court stayed
the Bivens claim until Baranski's criminal investigation ended. 2 17  The
court also rejected the request to unseal the supporting affidavit.2 18
On July 3, 2002, a grand jury indicted Baranski "for making 'a false
entry on any application, return, or record required by [the firearm impor-
tation laws], knowing such entry to be false.'" 2 19 The grand jury also at-
tempted to forfeit the seized firearms and evidence obtained from the








211. Id. at 437.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (holding that monetary damages are available to individuals when government
agents violate their constitutional rights).




219. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5861(I) (2002)). More specifically, Baranski was indicted for violat-
ing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(1), which stated: "It shall be unlawful for any person - (I) to make, or cause the
making of, a false entry on any application, return, or record required by this chapter [26 USCS §§ 5801
et seq.], knowing such entry to be false."
220. Id.
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from the search warrant. 221 However, his motion to suppress was denied
by the district court.222
In November 2002, Baranski was found guilty and sentenced to sixty
months imprisonment. 2 3 After his trial, the district court lifted the stay on
his Bivens claim.22 4 On March 14, 2003, the district court found the agents
were subject to qualified immunity, because the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 225 Exactly two years later, a panel of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling. 226
The panel's decision was based on the Supreme Court's ruling in
Groh.2 27 The panel wrote, "the warrant was facially deficient because the
affidavit referenced in the warrant and describing the items to be seized
was under seal and was not attached to the warrant when the search was
conducted." 22 8 On August 5, 2005, the full Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated the panel's decision and reheard the case.229
c. A Summation of the Pertinent Portions of the Majority Opinion
The court first asked whether the BATF agents were required to get a
search warrant before searching the Pars warehouse. 23 0 Both the govern-
ment and Baranski agreed the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause ap-
plied to this specific search.2 3 1
Next, the court asked whether this search warrant satisfied the War-
rant Clause when the "warrant itself did not describe with particularity the
items to be seized but expressly incorporated an affidavit that did describe
them."23 2 It noted BATF agents presented two items to the neutral and
detached magistrate. 233 The first item was the warrant itself.234 The second
item was the supporting affidavit.235 On the portion of the warrant re-
questing the items to be seized, Johnson wrote "See Attached Affidavit,"
which identified the items that could be seized.23 6
The court believed this was proper incorporation under its prior prece-







227. Id.; Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
228. Baranski, 452 F.3d at 437-38.
229. Id. at 438.
230. Id. at 438-39.






237. Id. at 440.
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Groh, the Supreme Court held a search warrant could cross-reference sup-
porting documents.23 8 After making this observation, the court discussed
the reasons Groh was inapplicable to Baranski's case.2 39 It stated that the
search warrant in Groh completely failed to incorporate the supporting af-
fidavit.24 0 In addition, the Groh warrant failed to identify the items police
could seize.24 1
Unlike the warrant in Groh, this search warrant incorporated the sup-
porting affidavit, was signed by a magistrate, and described the items being
seized.242 For these reasons, the court held the warrant was constitution-
ally valid.24 3
The court of appeals also discussed whether the warrant should have
been presented to Baranski prior to the search.244 Baranski argued that
the Groh decision established a rule that the supporting affidavit must be
given to the property owner.245 The court disagreed with Baranski's inter-
pretation of Groh.246 It noted that in Groh, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure require police to present a warrant before
commencing a search.247
5. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: United States
v. Hurwitz (2006)
a. The Factual Background
Dr. William E. Hurwitz ("Hurwitz") was a doctor who specialized in
the treatment of pain.2 48 Hurwitz's practice required him to prescribe
many controlled substances, such as methadone, oxycodone, and
hydromorphone.2 4 9 In 2002, federal agents learned some of his patients
had been arrested for trying to sell prescription drugs.2 5 0 Hurwitz's pa-
tients told federal investigators that Hurwitz supplied them with the medi-




241. Id. at 439-40.
242. Id. at 440.
243. Id. at 450.
244. Id. at 441-42.
245. Id. at 442.
246. Id. at 443.
247. Id.
248. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 2006).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 466-67.
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drug charges. 252 He was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment.253
b. The Procedural History
Prior to Hurwitz's trial, federal agents executed search warrants from
his home and business.254 The warrants were supported by the affidavit of
Agent Fulton S. Lucas ("Lucas"). 255 Lucas's affidavit stated that local law
enforcement agencies reported "an unusually high incident of arrests of
individuals for distributing prescription narcotics in the Northern and
Southwest region of the state of Virginia, and rural areas of West Virginia
and Tennessee."256 Lucas also noted that information obtained from the
arrest of these individuals showed that the person responsible for prescrib-
ing the medication was Hurwitz.257
On the portion of the search warrant application that asked the agent
to "describe the person or property to be seized," Lucas wrote "See At-
tachment A of Affidavit." 258 Lucas's supporting attachment listed the spe-
cific items the government sought to seize.259
The magistrate issued the warrant.260 In addition, Lucas's warrant ap-
plication and supporting affidavit were placed under seal.261 The warrant
itself did not particularly describe the items sought or person to be
seized.262 Instead, "in the space reserved for a description of the items to
be seized - the words "See Attachment" had been entered." 2 6 3
c. A Summation of the Pertinent Portions of the Majority Opinion
Hurwitz argued that the court should adopt the majority perspec-
tive.2M His rationale for this argument was based on the Groh decision.2 6 5
In response, the court noted that Groh did not establish a rule for warrant
incorporation. 26 6 "Instead[,] Groh simply acknowledge[d] the approach
generally followed by the Courts of Appeals." 267
252. Id. at 467. Hurwitz was indicted on one count of conspiracy to engage in drug trafficking, one
count of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, two counts of healthcare fraud, and fifty-eight
counts of drug trafficking.
253. Id. at 469. "The jury acquitted Hurwitz of six counts of drug trafficking, as well as one count
of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and two counts of healthcare fraud. The jury failed to
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The court recognized that a majority of federal courts of appeals re-
quired a search warrant to reference the supporting document and have the
supporting document attached to the warrant itself.2 6 8 However, as the
court ruled, the Fourth Circuit only requires that the search warrant either
properly reference the supporting document or the supporting document
be attached to the search warrant.26 9 In this case, the search warrant was
valid because it properly incorporated the supporting affidavit. 270
The court also addressed Hurwitz's argument that the Fourth Amend-
ment required the supporting affidavit be attached to the warrant itself.271
The court disagreed with this argument.27 2 It noted the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require the executing official to provide a copy of the war-
rant before executing it.273  "In fact, the Fourth Amendment is not
offended where the executing officer fails to leave a copy of the search
warrant with the property owner following the search, or fails even to carry
the warrant during the search." 2 74
Moreover, the court believed the purpose of the particularity require-
ment did not include allowing citizens to monitor government searches of
their homes and property.275 It also recognized the search warrant did not
need to be present during the search, because the Fourth Amendment did
not support citizens "'engag[ing] the police in a debate' about the
warrant. "276
V. GROH v. RAMIREZ' THE SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES
THE ISSUE, BUT DOES NOT ADDRESS IT.
This section will explore the Supreme Court's decision in Groh v. Ra-
mirez. This section will extensively focus on the facts of the case, as well as
the Court's majority opinion.
A. The Factual Background
In February 1997, Jeff Groh ("Groh") learned that Joseph Ramirez
("Ramirez") kept a large amount of firearms at his ranch.277 These fire-
arms included an automatic rifle, grenades, grenade launcher, and rocket
launcher.278 Groh submitted an application for a warrant to search Rami-
rez's ranch.279 Groh's search warrant application stated the purpose of the
268. Id. (emphasis added).
269. Id. (emphasis added).







277. Groh, 540 U.S. at 554.
278. Id. Possession of these unregistered items violated several federal laws: 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861.
279. Id.
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search was for "any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, de-
structive devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers,
rocket launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the purchase or
manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or launchers. "280
When Groh submitted the search warrant application he also provided
a supporting affidavit. 2 81 This supporting affidavit described Groh's belief
that Ramirez had illegal contraband on the property.282 Both the search
warrant application and supporting affidavit were presented to the court
magistrate.283 The magistrate issued the search warrant.284
The search warrant's application particularly described the place to be
searched, as well as the contraband Groh would seize.285 However, the
warrant itself was not particular.286 In fact, "it failed to identify any of the
items that [the] petitioner intended to seize." 287 The section of the warrant
seeking a description of the person or items to be seized merely provided a
description of Ramirez's home.288 Additionally, Groh's warrant did not
incorporate, by reference, the items listed in the search warrant
application.289
The search warrant was executed a day after the magistrate allowed
it.290 According to Ramirez's wife, who was present during execution of
the warrant, Groh stated he was looking for "an explosive device in a
box." 2 9 1 Groh said he "described the objects of the search to Mrs. Ramirez
in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone." 292 The search resulted in the
recovery of no weapons.293
After finishing the search, Groh gave Ramirez's wife a copy of the
search warrant.294 However, Groh did not give Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the
search warrant's application, because it was placed under seal.2 95 The day
after the search, Groh faxed the Ramirezes attorney a copy of the part of










289. Id. at 554-55.
290. Id. at 555.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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B. The Procedural History
The Ramirezes sued Groh under Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.297 They
raised eight separate claims, which included a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 298 The District Court for the District of Montana entered
summary judgment and held "the warrant [was] sufficiently detailed if the
executing officers [could] locate the correct house." 2 9 In addition, the
court ruled "the failure of the warrant to describe the objects of the search
amounted to a mere 'typographical error."'o
30
The district court's decision was almost entirely affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.o1 The court of appeals did not agree with the
district court's decision regarding the Ramirezes' Fourth Amendment
claim.302 More specifically, the court of appeals held, "the warrant was in-
valid because it did not 'describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the items to be seized,' and [the] oral statements by [Groh] during or
after the search could not cure the omission. "303 In addition, it noted the
search warrant's lack of particularity increased the chances of confronta-
tion between the Ramirezes and the police.304 Moreover, the court of ap-
peals believed the warrant's lack of particularity also "deprived
respondents of the means 'to challenge officers who might have exceeded
the limits imposed by the magistrate."' 30s The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals.306
C An Analysis of the Pertinent Portions of
Justice Steven's Majority Opinion
The Court began its analysis by noting the Fourth Amendment states
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by an Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." 0 The Court noted that Groh's search war-
rant satisfied three of these requirements, because it was based on probable
cause, supported by a sworn affidavit, and described the place to be
searched. 3 08 However, the warrant did not particularly describe the items
to being seized.309
Instead, the search warrant's application described the things to be
seized.31 0 Nevertheless, the Court stated the plain text of the Fourth
297. Id. The Ramirezes also sued the other federal agents participating in the search.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 555-56.
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Amendment required particularity in the search warrant itself and not the
311documents supporting the warrant.31 More specifically, the Court wrote,
"[t]he fact that the application adequately described the 'things to be
seized' does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth
Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not the sup-
porting documents."3 1 2
The Court did recognize the Fourth Amendment allowed search war-
rants to cross-reference other documents.3 1 3 It wrote, "[i]ndeed, most
Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with ref-
erence to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropri-
ate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies
the warrant." 314 However, the Court refused to further discuss the issue of
incorporation, because Groh's search warrant did not incorporate the sup-
porting affidavit; and because, the supporting affidavit was not attached to
the warrant itself.3 15
The Groh decision does not shed much light on the issue of incorpora-
tion. To make things more confusing, the Court provides an indication it
would adopt either the majority or minority perspectives.3 1 6 For instance,
when the court discussed the rule of incorporation it used the rule estab-
lished by courts following the majority perspective. However, it also
stated, "'[t]he presence of a search warrant serves a high function' . . . and
that high function is not necessarily vindicated when some other document,
somewhere, says something about the objects of the search ... ."317 Hence,
the Court is saying that attaching a supporting document to the warrant
itself may be enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity re-
quirement. 318 This is a notion that is prominent in courts following the
minority perspective. The Court may also be indicating that words of in-
corporation are superfluous to the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement.3 1 9
VI. ANALYSIS: A PLAIN MEANING AND POLICY ORIENTED APPROACH
This section will advocate for adoption of the majority perspective by
discussing the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, the public policies
underlying the Fourth Amendment, and the reasons these policies support
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A. Plain-meaning
Under a plain-meaning analysis, the Fourth Amendment requires the
warrant itself, and not the supporting document, to describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized. If federal courts followed the
plain-meaning approach to search warrant incorporation, then incorpora-
tion would not be an issue. Under a plain-meaning analysis there would
not be a need to examine a supporting document, because all constitutional
requirements would have to be contained on the warrant itself.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the federal courts of appeals have
taken this rigid interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit a search warrant from referencing a supporting document.320 It has
even acknowledged that most courts of appeals interpret a search warrant
with reference to a supporting document if the warrant uses appropriate
words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the
warrant. 32 ' However, this does not answer whether or not the Fourth
Amendment requires the supporting document to be attached to the search
warrant during its execution.
The Court's recognition of incorporation is not surprising especially
considering the problems that could arise from requiring law enforcement
officials to place every bit of information on the warrant itself. For in-
stance, search warrants are typically written or typed on a single sheet of
paper. Requiring law enforcement officers to put all information within
the confines of the single page could overload the warrant with text, in
effect making the warrant unreadable.
Pragmatically, the idea of incorporation also makes sense, because it
allows the warrant applicant to provide as much information as possible to
the magistrate. For example, supplemental documents allow warrant appli-
cants to provide magistrates with information that could not otherwise fit
within the borders of the search warrant page. This excess information re-
sults in the magistrate being more capable of assessing whether or not to
grant the search warrant request.
Overall, the courts have recognized the vital role incorporation plays
in Fourth Amendment interpretation. After considering the Supreme
Court's statements, as well as the plain-language of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the question becomes whether the particularity requirement is satis-
fied by either incorporation into the search warrant or incorporation and
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B. Fourth Amendment Public Policies
When analyzing the issue of search warrant incorporation, one must
remember the history and public policies underlying the Fourth Amend-
ment. Hence, this means analyzing more than the plain words or text of
the Fourth Amendment.
The following subsections will discuss some of the main policies under-
lying the Fourth Amendment. In addition, these subsections will explain
the reasons these policies support adoption of the majority perspective.
Many of these policies are based on the same arguments. However, this
does not negate the fact that they each individually, and as a whole, sup-
port adoption of the majority perspective of search warrant incorporation.
1. Mandating Attachment of the Supporting Document
a. Assuring Citizens the Executing Officer has Lawful Authority to
Search and Seize Property
The government should only use a search warrant when it has the law-
ful authority to search and seize property. This means having a fully com-
pleted warrant attached to any properly incorporated supporting
document. In other words, in order for the search warrant to be lawful, the
warrant - i.e. a warrant that contains probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, issued by a neutral and detached magistrate and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized -
must be completed upon execution of the search.
The government's search is viewed as an act of lawful authority if a
citizen is able to see the specific reasons for the government's presence.
Additionally, this view of lawful authority is furthered since the citizen can
see the government is conducting the search within the proper framework
of the Fourth Amendment. Lawful authority is negated when the docu-
ment that directly states the search warrant's purpose is not present during
warrant's execution.
When the police execute a search warrant that does not have any incli-
nation of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,
citizens can be left dumbfounded as to the government's reason for being
on their property. Hence, as our Supreme Court noted, this policy "is not
necessarily vindicated when some other document, somewhere, says some-
thing about the objects of the search, but the contents of that document are
neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available
for her inspection." 322 Moreover, as one court noted, "the purpose of
handing the occupant ... the [search] warrant ... is to head off breaches of
the peace by dispelling any suspicion that the search is illegitimate." 32 3
322. Id.
323. United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1035 (7th Cir. 1999).
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b. Limiting the Government's Discretion During Execution of the
Search Warrant
In addition to informing citizens about the parameters of the govern-
ment's search warrant, the particularity requirement also informs executing
officers about the parameters of it. This policy comes into effect when the
search warrant applicant is not present for the execution of the warrant or
execution of the warrant requires the use of several officers.
Many problems can arise when both the search warrant's applicant
and the warrant's properly incorporated supporting document are not pre-
sent when the warrant is executed. For instance, the officer executing the
warrant would not know the parameters of the search, because the docu-
ment providing the parameters of the search would not be present during
the search. These are problems that could be avoided by attaching the sup-
porting document to the search warrant.
These same problems arise when several officers are executing a
search warrant. Arguably, an officer could orally inform other officers
about the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. How-
ever, oral notification could result in the misinterpretation or confusion
about the search. Practically, having the warrant itself, as well as the prop-
erly incorporated supporting document, would reduce any misinterpreta-
tion or confusion that could arise during the search warrant's execution.
c. Probable Cause for the Search Warrant
"The chief purpose of the particularity requirement [is] to prevent
general searches by requiring a neutral judicial officer to cabin the scope of
the search to those areas and items for which there exist probable cause
that a crime has been committed."324 The neutral and detached magistrate
examines numerous documents before issuing a search warrant. In fact,
some of these items, such as the affidavit in support of the search warrant,
contain the probable cause needed to issue the search warrant. The search
warrant would not issue if these supporting documents were not presented
to the neutral and detached magistrate. Recognizing this, it only makes
sense that all documents used to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's search
warrant requirements are attached to the warrant itself when the warrant is
executed.
d. Giving Notice to the Person Subject to the Search
Another purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity require-
ment is to give the property owner notice of the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. Notice cannot be given when the supporting
document, which contains these descriptions, is not attached to the war-
rant. In effect, the government is conducting general searches when it
keeps the search warrant's supporting document under seal. In fact, when
the supporting document is kept under seal, there is no way the subject of
324. See Baranski, 452 F.3d at 441.
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the search can challenge the parameters of the search prior to the warrant's
execution. Hence, by not providing the subject of the search with notice,
the government could perform searches limitless in nature.
e. Protecting Citizens Interest in Monitoring the Search
Citizens maintain an interest in monitoring searches even though the
application and issuance of the search warrant is a government initiated
process. Our Founding Fathers even agreed with this notion. For instance,
they greatly disapproved of colonists' inability to question the purpose or
scope of general warrants.
This monitoring function is best achieved by allowing a citizen to have
the completed search warrant at the time of the search. Having the com-
pleted warrant gives the citizen a mechanism for monitoring the search and
making sure the government's actions are coinciding with what is on the
search warrant. Moreover, this policy reinforces the notion that people
should "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures ... "325
f. Avoiding General Searches
"The particularity requirement is intended 'to prevent the police from
undertaking a general exploratory rummaging through a person's belong-
ings."' 3 2 6 As previously mentioned, general warrants gave the government
free-range and unbridled discretion to search anyplace or anything at any-
time. A primary reason the Fourth Amendment was adopted was to end
this type of general rummaging conducted by the government. Curtailing
general exploratory searches is difficult, especially when the document that
identifies the parameters of the search warrant is not present during the
warrant's execution.3 2 7
2. Mandating Words of Reference on the Search Warrant
The neutral and detached magistrate must have notice of all docu-
ments being used to get the warrant issued and in turn, access to the place
to be searched and items or things to be seized. By writing words of refer-
ence, such as see attached affidavit or as described in the affidavit, on the
warrant itself, a magistrate knows that additional information is necessary
to issuance of the warrant. In addition, before a search warrant can incor-
porate a supporting document, the warrant must state which documents are
being incorporated. The magistrate should not have to assume that all pa-
pers presented to them are relevant to issuance of the warrant. Instead, the
325. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
326. Bartholomew, 221 F.3d at 428.
327. Another policy to consider would be judicial economy. The criminal courts are extremely
backlogged with cases. The dockets are filed with trials, pre-trials, motions for discovery, motions to
suppress, and arraignments - to name a few. Specifically, motions to suppress take a lot of time and
effort. This time and effort is increased when the defense attorney does not have a complete search
warrant. Thus, instead of filing a motion to suppress, the attorney would have to file a motion to unseal
the affidavit or supporting document. In effect, adding another motion to the judicial docket.
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search warrant applicant should clearly delineate - in the warrant itself -
those supporting documents that are relevant to its issuance, as well as
those supporting documents it wishes to incorporate into the warrant.
VII. APPLYING THE LEON EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
This section of the Article will discuss whether the Leon exception to
the exclusionary rule should apply when: 1) the search warrant properly
incorporates the supporting document and the supporting document is at-
tached to the warrant; 2) the search warrant properly incorporates the sup-
porting document but the supporting document is not attached to the
warrant; 3) the search warrant does not properly incorporate the support-
ing document and the supporting document is not attached to the warrant;
and 4) the search warrant does not properly incorporate the supporting
document but the supporting document is attached to the warrant.
A. United States v. Leon
In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule
is inapplicable when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a
warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate." Hence, if a police
officer or executing official relies, in good faith, on an invalid search war-
rant, any evidence obtained from the use of that warrant can be used
against the defendant.
B. Applying Leon
1. The Search Warrant Properly Incorporates the Supporting Document
and the Supporting Document is Attached to the Warrant
This type of search warrant is valid under both the minority and ma-
jority perspective. In addition, these warrants are valid under the federal
Constitution. Thus, Leon would not be applicable to these types of
warrants.
2. The Search Warrant Properly Incorporates the Supporting Document
but the Supporting Document is not Attached to the Warrant
The Leon exception should not apply to situations where the search
warrant incorporates the supporting document, but the document is not
attached to the warrant. In this situation, a warrant that incorporates an-
other document, but is not attached to that document would be "so facially
deficient .. . that the executing [officer] cannot reasonably presume it to be
valid.""2
The Constitution and prior court precedence provides executing of-
ficers' notice that a search warrant must be supported by an oath or affir-
mation, issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, based on probable
328. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
329. Id. at 923.
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cause, and describe with particularity the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized. If one of these requirements is omitted from the
warrant, the police or executing official cannot claim to have relied on the
warrant in good faith. Moreover, an officer cannot have reasonably relied
on a search warrant when the portion of the warrant providing the items to
be seized is not attached to the warrant.
3. The Search Warrant Does Not Properly Incorporate the Supporting
Document and the Supporting Document is not Attached to
the Warrant
The Leon exception should not apply to situations where the search
warrant does not properly incorporate the supporting document and the
supporting document is not attached to the warrant. In this situation, the
warrant is completely invalid and no officer can have relied on the warrant
in good faith. This type of search warrant does not meet any of the re-
quirements of incorporation under either the majority or minority
perspectives.
4. The Search Warrant Does Not Properly Incorporate the Supporting
Document but the Supporting Document is Attached to the
Warrant
The Leon exception should apply to situations where the search war-
rant has not properly incorporated the supporting document, but the sup-
porting document is attached to the warrant. In this case, the police could
reasonably believe that the warrant was valid.
The issue would be whether it is reasonable to rely on a warrant that
improperly incorporates a supporting document, even when that support-
ing document is attached to the warrant. It may be reasonable if the search
warrant uses incorrect words of incorporation. Since the supporting docu-
ment is attached to the search warrant the police could reasonably infer the
warrant correctly incorporated that document. Most importantly, the po-
lice would have the document that informs them of the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our federal Constitution requires search warrants meet specific re-
quirements. It must be supported by an oath or affirmation; issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate; based on probable cause to believe that
persons or things to be seized will be found in the place to be searched; and
describe with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Instead of allowing police to execute warrants that
reference documents located in places unknown, courts should require po-
lice to attach correctly referenced documents to the search warrant. This
not only maintains credibility within the law enforcement agency, but also
reinforces the public policies ingrained in the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
2010] 81

